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This is a summary of the presentation by Professor Daniel Kah-
neman, Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology and Professor
Public Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton
University, Princeton, NJ, USA, given at the ISPOR “Building a
Pragmatic Road: Moving the QALY Forward” Consensus Devel-
opment Workshop, as a continuation of the discussion on an
experience-based approach to health state valuation, as presented
on May 2005 at the ISPOR 10th Annual International Meeting
First Plenary Session, “Determinants of Health Economic Deci-
sions in Actual Practice: The Role of Behavioral Economics” at:
http://www.ispor.org /meetings / Invitational /Plenary%20
Presentation%20by%20D%20Kahneman.pdf [1,2], and
debated at the Invited Issue Panel, “Will the QALY Survive” [3,4]
at the ISPOR 11th Annual International Meeting, May 2006.
Upon further examination of the role of experience-based
utility in the assessment of health states [5], I have come to the
conclusion that it is not going to happen within the quality-
adjusted life-year (QALY). It could complicate the QALY; if we
start asking very different questions, then we try to integrate
these responses into the QALY framework. This argument is
similar to a debate that I had with a group of economists who do
contingent valuations of the environment. Survey techniques are
used; people’s responses to these survey techniques are expected
to obey the axioms of utility theory, similar to those in develop-
ing a QALY. People, however, do not obey the axioms of
expected utility. It is easy to show inconsistencies: when we look
for inconsistencies, we ﬁnd them. So, a technique that is essen-
tially built on the denial of inconsistencies has a problem.
Consider the possibility that the utility used in developing the
QALY may be wrong but that those trying to test it cannot do so
from within QALY framework. As an analogy, imagine that you
are a physicist. It is the 19th century. People believe in ether. You
have been developing a measure for the viscosity of the ether.
Now, breakthroughs in physics are unlikely to come from your
deliberations, because you are committed to the assumption that
there is ether, but you are having measurement problems that you
acknowledge but see only as measurement problems. An alter-
ative hypothesis that there may not be ether is a very alien idea.
You should not even expect that you are going to come to it, but
you know it is a problem. This is one of the issues with QALYs.
Another issue, with respect to experience-based utility, is that
all perspectives are valid—what people want, what satisﬁes them,
and their experiences, but, because of adaptation, there may be
different values depending on whether you are measuring an
experience or measuring a preference by an “experienced”
person. For example, patients with colostomy think they are
happy with the colostomy, and they expect to be happy again
without it. But when it is removed, they remember their previous
state as absolutely horrible; and, in terms of preferences, they are
willing to pay a great deal, including life-years, to get rid of that
state [6]. But there is an immediate problem from this reversal in
perception in that it seems impossible to generate a number that
decision-makers will take seriously. And this is another troubling
point of similarity between contingent valuation and QALYs.
In both cases, there is a tacit collusion between the researchers
and the decision-makers, that the researchers will provide the
decision-makers with a number that is simple. In contingent
valuation, it is dollars. Here, it is QALYs. It is generated in such
a way that it is almost impossible to question. The inconsistencies
are within the QALY calculation. It is not that you can go back
and reanalyze and show within your data that there are incon-
sistencies. It is very difﬁcult to do. Similar to contingent valua-
tion, it is impossible to ﬁnd the inconsistencies. You have to ask
questions that they do not get routinely asked. The moment you
ask them, the QALY breaks apart. But within their guidelines or
the questions they are asking, you will never catch the problem.
It is my impression that it is hard to question QALYs from the
“inside”; and that is one major problem with the QALY. In a
way, the QALY has to be designed so that the decision-maker will
recognize its value.
The question is: is there any other way? Life is extremely
complicated, and we do need something like QALYs, but we need
to speak to decision-makers in simple terms. That might suggest
a completely different approach to the measurement of health
states. A suggestion that I also gave to economists working with
contingent valuations of the environment is to establish juries of
citizens with varied membership (economists, health statisticians,
patients), and examine in detail six to ten health states spanning
the range from very severe to relatively mild, and assign them
relative values. In so doing, encounter all relevant problems, but
admit that we are looking for one number that will help health-
care decision-makers allocate health-care resources efﬁciently.
Then, when such a scale is built, develop a procedure that, when
another health state is considered, the question gets narrowed to
where it is on the scale, between 1 and 2 or between 3 and 4 or
between 5 and 6. Develop procedures for making these second-
ary judgments. Set up one scale facing all the complexities of the
data, the internal inconsistency, philosophical issues, the relative
weight of experience, and other ways to look at utilities. But
think of that, and then use that scale, which would be a scale that
decision-makers could use, as a scaffolding, to build a more
detailed understanding and a more detailed way of looking at all
health states. I consider this a practical proposal that would be
simple to implement. It would generate one scale and it would
generate one set of numbers. They may or may not be similar to
those used in the QALY. They could be very different numbers,
perhaps better numbers.
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